4 explicit memory, although it is questionable whether implicit and explicit tasks directly correspond to different subsystems of memory, and strict criteria of independence are rarely satisfied (Roediger, Rajaram, & Srinivas, 1990; Sherry & Schacter, 1987) . Rather, it is more likely that implicit and explicit tasks differentially call upon specific component processes that may be organized (at least conceptually) into subsystems of memory (e.g., Johnson, 1983; Johnson & Hirst, 1993; Moscovitch, 1992; Roediger, Buckner, & McDermott, 1999) . Furthermore, from the perspective of a component process approach, mechanisms of interaction between subsystems are as interesting as potential dissociations between subsystems (e.g., Johnson & Reeder, 1997) .
Exploring the nature of perceptual representations
Implicit tests do not require participants to explicitly attribute particular events to the past; they assess whether prior exposure to a stimulus in the experimental setting influences later processing of the same or a related stimulus (e.g., during a perceptual identification or lexical decision task). When there is a positive effect for the same stimulus (i.e., faster or more accurate performance) the phenomenon is known as "repetition priming" (e.g., Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Wiggs & Martin, 1998) . Studies of implicit memory have generated a great deal of information about the nature of perceptual representations.
For example, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) showed that a brief (1 sec) exposure to a word during study resulted in more accurate perceptual identification of the word when it was briefly flashed later during the test phase. Repetition priming has resulted in superior performance across various tasks (word identification, Alexander & Reinitz, 2000; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Murrell & Morton, 1974; lexical Grant & Logan, 1993; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979 ; word stem completion, Bassili, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992 ; word fragment completion, Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Roediger et al., 1992; Sloman, Hayman, Ohta, Law, & Tulving, 1988; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982;  picture naming, Durso & Johnson, 1979; picture identification, Warren & Morton, 1982;  picture fragment identification, Mitchell, 2006; sound identification, Chiu, 2000; visual search, Maljkovic, & Nakayama, 1994) , and repetition priming occurs for various types of stimuli including visually presented words (Alexander & Reinitz, 2000; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Murrell & Morton, 1974 ), word-pairs (Goshen-Gottstein & Moscovitch, 1995 , non-words (Butler, Berry, & Helman, 2004; Kirsner & Smith, 1974; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977) , faces (Bruce, Carson, Burton, & Kelly, 1998; Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Ellis, Young, Flude, & Hay, 1987) , scenes (Yi, Turk-Browne, Chun, & Johnson, 2008) , pictures of familiar objects (Bartram, 1974; Cave, 1997; Durso & Johnson, 1979) , novel objects or patterns (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin, 1990; Musen & Treisman, 1990; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990) , and for auditory words (Bassili et al., 1989; Jackson & Morton, 1984) and sounds (Chiu, 2000) . One of the most striking features of repetition priming is that, despite relatively brief study exposure, effects can last days (Roediger et al., 1992) , weeks (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Musen & Treisman, 1990) , months (Cave, 1997; Grant & Logan, 1993; Sloman et al., 1988) , and even years (Mitchell, 2006) from the original encounter and across multiple intervening items (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Musen & Treisman, 1990; Yi et al., 2008) .
An early, systematic, and influential investigation of the characteristics of perceptual memory was a study by Musen and Treisman (1990) . It came at a time when interest in implicit memory had received a boost not only from studies of healthy young adults (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) , but also from demonstrations of implicit memory in individuals with profound amnesia on explicit tests (e.g., Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, & Wolbarst, 1985; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1982) . Most of this previous work used stimuli such as words for which there would likely be preexisting representations (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) or unfamiliar pictures of objects that could easily be named (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1979) . Musen and Treisman used novel line patterns. Participants studied visual patterns (either once or multiple times) constructed from 5 connecting lines joining dots in a 3 x 3 matrix (see Figure 2) . On an implicit memory test, studied and new patterns were briefly flashed one at a time and then masked and participants were asked to draw each pattern. Drawing accuracy was better for previously seen than new patterns (perceptual priming), and the advantage for previously seen items was at almost the same level for patterns seen once during the study session as for those seen multiple times. This perceptual priming effect showed little or no decrease across a range of delays up to as long as one month. In contrast, on a test of explicit memory (4-alternative forced-choice recognition), recognition for studied patterns benefited from repeated study exposures, and decreased significantly across the various delays. Finally, for any particular item, implicit and explicit memory showed stochastic independence. In short, Musen and Treisman demonstrated a case of rapid and long-lasting implicit memory for novel visual patterns that was independent of whether participants showed explicit recognition of having seen the visual patterns before. Such Running Head: PERCEPTION & REFLECTION 7 findings, implying that long-term memory records are a general consequence of perception, fit well with the idea of multiple memory systems, especially models positing perceptual subsystems (e.g., Johnson, 1983; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) .
Given how rapidly such representations can be formed, one might expect them to lack detail. In fact, perceptual representations of briefly presented stimuli can be highly specific (for reviews, see Ochsner, Chiu, & Schacter, 1994; Wiggs & Martin, 1998) , as evidenced by greater priming for a repeated item that is more similar perceptually to the original. Greater priming is observed when study and test items are presented in the same modality (i.e., both perceptually and semantically similar) versus in a different modality (i.e., semantically but not perceptually similar). For example, greater priming has been observed for visually presented test items that were previously experienced visually compared to auditorially (e.g., Bassili et al., 1989; Blaxton, 1989; Challis & Sidhu, 1993) and vice verse for auditory test items (Bassili et al., 1989; Jackson & Morton, 1984) . Within modality, priming tends to be greater when the study and test items are in the same format. For example, Roediger et al. (1992) found greater priming on a word completion task for items previously presented as seen words than as pictures.
Similarly, greater priming occurs for picture fragment naming (Srinivas, 1993; Weldon & Roediger, 1987) and picture naming (Durso & Johnson, 1979; Warren & Morton, 1982) when the items have previously been presented as pictures than as words (but see Brown, Neblett, Jones, & Mitchell, 1991) .
Within the same format, priming is greater when participants are tested on the same exemplar than a different exemplar from the same category (e.g., for objects, Cave, Bost, & Cobb, 1996 ; for sounds, Chiu, 2000, but see Stuart & Jones, 1995 (Graf & Ryan, 1990; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Kinoshita & Wayland, 1993; Wiggs & Martin, 1994) can reduce priming. Whether representations are specific to letter case is unclear; some studies have shown no effect of letter case on the magnitude of priming for words (Bowers, 1996) , while others have shown that, under certain conditions, changes in lettercase reduce the amount of priming observed (e.g., words tested in lower case letters, Jacoby & Hayman, 1987 , or words presented to the right hemisphere, Burgund & Marsolek, 1997; Marsolek, 2004) . For familiar objects, changes in surface contours (Srinivas, 1993) and viewpoint orientation (Burgund & Marsolek, 2000; Murray, Jolicoeur, McMullen, & Ingleton, 1993; Srinivas, 1993) reduce priming. Repetition priming for faces has also been shown to be sensitive to viewpoint (Bruce et al., 1998) .
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that certain brain areas generally show a decrease in neural signal for repeated compared to novel stimuli (e.g., Desimone, 1996; Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Squire et al., 1992) . This decrease is known as "repetition attenuation" (also called "repetition suppression" or "neural adaptation") and is thought to be the neural correlate of repetition priming (for reviews, see Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Henson, 2003; Wiggs & Martin, 1998) . The cause of this attenuation of neural activity is still a matter of some debate. One possibility is that repeated exposure to the same stimulus results in a pruning or sharpening of that stimulus' representation in cortex (Desimone, 1996; Wiggs & Martin, 1998) . Neurons not essential to the coding of the stimulus drop out (are "pruned"), resulting in fewer neurons firing in response to the Running Head: PERCEPTION & REFLECTION 9 stimulus when it is presented again. Hence, while the selectivity of the neural response increases, its overall level of activation decreases.
In any case, repetition attenuation can be taken as an index of the type of information represented in a brain area (e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 1999; James, Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2002; Park & Chun, 2009; Park, Chun & Johnson, in press; Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2002 ; for reviews, see Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004) . For example, while the magnitude of behavioral repetition priming is often preserved across changes in stimulus size (e.g., Biederman & Cooper, 1992) , Grill-Spector et al. (1999) found that repetition attenuation in posterior lateral occipital cortex, an area associated with perceptual processing of objects, was sensitive to changes in object size. Different regions show sensitivity to Studies have also shown neural sensitivity to changes in object exemplar (in fusiform cortex, Koutstaal et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002) To summarize, representations of the perceptual details of even a brief stimulus can be rapidly formed, long-lasting, robust to interference from intervening stimuli, and demonstrate high specificity on both the neural and behavioral level.
Exploring the interaction of perceptual and reflective processes
Although a great deal of emphasis has been given to dissociations between memory subsystems subserving explicit memories arising from reflective processes and implicit memories arising from perceptual processes, recent studies in our lab show interactions of reflective and perceptual processing as would be expected according to the MEM model (Johnson, 1983; Johnson & Hirst, 1993) . We start by describing the basic reflective component process of refreshing, which involves briefly thinking of (i.e., directing reflective attention to) the still active representation of a just-experienced event.
We show how this simple process acts to provide top-down modulation of posterior brain areas and influences subsequent perceptual processing. Then we discuss how perceptual memory can influence the outcome of reflective processing, in this case, episodic pictures, a picture of a scene and a picture of a face, shown simultaneously, side by side (see Figure 3a) . Next participants were shown one of the pictures a second time or they were cued by a dot on the left or right to think of (i.e., refresh) the picture that had just been in that location. In addition to prefrontal activation associated with refreshing (Raye, Johnson, Mitchell, Reeder, & Greene, 2002) , as shown in Figure 3b Higgins and Johnson (2009) showed that refreshing a target item reduces the accessibility of distractors that were present at the time of refreshing. Participants saw a set of three words, and then either saw and read aloud one of the words again, or were given a location cue to think of and say aloud (i.e., refresh) the word that had just appeared in that location (Task 1). During Task 2, participants saw the set of words a second time, and then either saw and read aloud one of the nonselected items from Task 1 or saw and read aloud a new word. Hence, we examined the accessibility of a Task 1 distractor (as reflected in response times on Task 2) as a function of whether the Task 1 target was processed perceptually or reflectively (see Figure 4a ).
Response times to read one of the Task 1 distractors were slower if the Task 1 target had been refreshed than if the Task 1 target had been read a second time (see Figure 4b ). In contrast, response times to read a new word on Task 2 were not influenced by the type of processing that occurred on Task 1. Hence, a brief act of reflective attention reduced the accessibility of the nonselected items during subsequent perceptual processing of these items.
Taken together, our studies suggest that refreshing, a basic reflective process, is one mechanism by which the perceptual and reflective systems interact. Refreshing a stimulus can positively (Yi et al., 2008) and negatively (Higgins and Johnson, 2009) influence subsequent perceptual processing of selected and nonselected stimuli, Finally, we consider how perceptual representations may influence not only implicit but also explicit measures of memory. Musen and Treisman (1990) demonstrated that despite the robustness of perceptual memory, we may not have conscious access to these representations. That is, they found perceptual representations can influence performance implicitly even when we fail to explicitly recognize the same information. Studies in our lab have shown that a perceptual representation of one event can implicitly influence memory for another event that is accessed explicitly (Lyle & Johnson, 2006 . For example, perceptual representations that are inadvertently activated can contribute to false memories (Lyle & Johnson, 2006) . Participants viewed drawings of some objects and imagined drawings of other objects in response to a label (see Figure 5 ). Perceived objects were presented on screen in different locations (or colors in another experiment). Labels for imagined objects were always presented in the center of the screen in black and white. During a later memory test which included labels only, participants reported whether they had perceived or imagined the object and, if they had reported perceiving it, in which location/color they had seen it. Participants were more likely to falsely remember an imagined item as having been perceived if it was perceptually similar to a perceived item (e.g., a lollipop was imagined and a magnifying glass was perceived) than when they were not (e.g., a feather was imagined and a belt Running Head: PERCEPTION & REFLECTION 14 was perceived). This suggests that when retrieving information about an imagined event (i.e., imagining the lollipop), perceptual information (e.g., shape) from a similar event (perceiving the magnifying glass) can become inadvertently activated (see also Henkel & Franklin, 1998; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998) . Because real events are associated with having more perceptual detail than imagined ones (Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Raye, 1981) , inadvertently activated perceptual detail makes imagined events more likely to be judged as having been perceived. Additionally, participants were more confident in their false memories for similar items compared to control items, and were more likely to attribute the associated contextual detail (i.e., location or color) of the similar perceived object to the imagined item. Presumably, perceptual details (i.e., shape, location, color, etc.) about the perceived event are bound together and when retrieval of the imagined event activates shared perceptual detail (e.g., shape) other information bound to shape information is also activated and attributed to the imagined event. This array of perceptual detail that is misattributed to the imagined item increases one's confidence that the item was in fact perceived. Hence, stored perceptual representations of a non-target event that become implicitly activated during cognitive processing can contribute to phenomenal experience of a target event, influencing the outcome of explicit memory attributions.
Summary
Musen and Treisman's (1990) study was influential in beginning to characterize a perceptual memory system that can rapidly learn novel stimuli and that contains robust representations that are long-lasting, surviving up to several weeks and across many intervening items. Subsequent studies have shown that perceptual memory can facilitate Running Head: PERCEPTION & REFLECTION 15 both the speed and accuracy of later processing involving the original stimulus and is reflected in reductions in the amount of neural activity required when the original stimulus is perceived again. Perceptual representations can be highly specific, having their greatest effect when the exact stimulus is encountered again.
While perceptual memory may be phylogenetically primitive, relatively automatic, and functionally dissociable from more reflectively-generated memory (e.g., Johnson & Hirst, 1993; Sherry & Schacter, 1987) , a crucial feature of human cognition is that perceptual and reflective processes interact (Johnson, 1983) . Recent findings from our lab show that even a brief act of reflective attention to a currently active perceptual representation results in activation of brain areas associated with perception of the original stimulus (M. R. Johnson et al., 2007) and has a facilitatory effect on subsequent processing that can be similar to having perceived the item a second time (Yi et al., 2008) . At the same time, when multiple perceptual representations are currently active, reflective attention towards one item impairs subsequent perceptual processing of the other items (Higgins & Johnson, 2009 ). When perceptual representations become active inadvertently, they can implicitly influence episodic (source) attributions resulting in false memories and enhanced confidence in those false memories (Lyle & Johnson, 2006 ).
Although there is much evidence for both realism and constructivism in human cognition, our understanding of exactly how they are instantiated in the human cognitive system is incomplete. The idea of interactions between bottom-up and top-down process is not new (e.g., Bruner & Postman, 1949; Neisser, 1967) Lyle and Johnson (2006) . On Perceive trials, participants saw a line drawing of an object with its associated label. Perceived objects could appear in one of four locations on the screen (Experiment 1A), or in one of four colors (Experiment 2). On Imagine trials, participants saw an object label in the center of the screen and imagined a line drawing of the object. Imagined items were either perceptually similar or dissimilar to an item perceived during the study session. For example, for perceptually similar items, participants saw a magnifying glass (above left), and imagined a lollipop, while for perceptually dissimilar items, participants saw a belt (above right), and imagined a feather. On a subsequent memory test, participants were more likely to misremember an imagined item as having been perceived if it was perceptually similar to a perceived item, and more likely to attribute features (location, color) of the similar perceived item to the imagined item. 
